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Abstract 
Control of wild animals may give rise to controversy, as is seen in the case of badger control to 
manage TB in cattle in the UK. However, it is striking that concerns about the potential suffering of 
the affected animals themselves are often given little attention or completely ignored in policies 
aimed at dealing with wild animals. McCulloch and Reiss argue that this could be remedied by 
means of a “mandatory application of formal and systematic Animal Welfare Impact Assessment 
(AWIA)”. Optimistically, they consider that an AWIA could help to resolve controversies involving 
wild animals. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the potential of AWIA. We begin by showing 
how ideas akin to AWIA already play a significant role in other animal ethics controversies, par-
ticularly those concerning laboratory animal use and livestock production; and we bring in lessons 
learnt from these controversies. Then we comment on the suggested development and application of 
AWIA in the case of badger control. Finally, we discuss the prospects of applying AWIA to other 
sorts of wild animal controversy. We argue that the AIWA, as developed by McCulloch and Reiss, 
relies on several dubious premises, including that killing is a welfare issue. Furthermore, we argue 
that AWIA is unlikely to prevent serious moral disagreements over how to weigh concerns about 
wild animals against priorities in human health, the health of domestic and farm animals, and biodi-
versity, but that it may nonetheless serve to limit harms imposed on the wild animals. 
  
1. Introduction 
We tend to regard animals living in the wild with considerable interest and, sometimes,  even affec-
tion (Manfredo, 2008). However, wildlife management also gives rise to conflicts (Swan et al., 
2017). These conflicts, which we will call “wild animal controversies”, involve a range of issues, 
many of which revolve around human livelihood and well-being, livestock protection and nature 
conservation. Controversy is often caused by human interventions that are designed to control popu-
lations of wild animals and to minimise what are perceived as their negative impacts (Woodroffe et 
al., 2005). Examples include the removal of feral cats and racoons where they are seen as a danger 
to indigenous animals; the management of naturally occurring wildlife, such as white deer in US 
suburban areas; the control of wild animals which act as vectors of diseases that threaten humans, 
such as foxes carrying rabies; and the exclusion of wild animals threatening the health of farm ani-
mals, such as wild hogs posing a risk of swine fever in domesticated pigs. Of course, the problem of 
badgers and TB in cattle addressed by McCulloch and Reiss in this issue is another case in point. 
 
In most cases there is no single answer to the question what our priorities should be when we are 
faced with problems such as these. Competing values and different priorities create ethical dilem-
mas and disagreements (Gamborg et al., 2012). However, it is striking that concerns about the po-
tential suffering of the affected animals themselves – that is, about wild animal welfare – are often 
given little attention or completely ignored in wild animal controversies. This ought to change, ac-
cording to McCulloch and Reiss. In their papers, they argue for “the mandatory application of for-
mal and systematic Animal Welfare Impact Assessment (AWIA) to all policy which potentially 
significantly impacts the interests of sentient animals”. For both authors, an important reason for 
making this suggestion is that AWIA can “provide objective data to feed into policy making”, 
thereby creating some common ground for a discussion that otherwise tends to become polarized 
from the outset. 
 
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the potential of AWIA to give concerns about animal welfare a 
key role in handling of wild animal controversies. We begin by showing how ideas akin to AWIA 
already play a significant role in other animal ethics issues, particularly those concerning laboratory 
animal use and livestock production. Then we comment on the development and application of 
AWIA in the case of badger control, as presented by McCulloch and Reiss. Finally, we discuss the 
prospects of applying AWIA to other sorts of wild animal controversy. We will not discuss the sci-
entific underpinning of the claim that badger culling will actually serve to protect cattle against TB 
but rather base our discussion on the hypothetical assumption that badger culling will serve this 
purpose. We argue that AWIA is unlikely to prevent serious moral disagreements over how to 
weigh concerns about wild animal welfare against priorities in human health, the health of domestic 
and farm animals, and biodiversity, but that it may nonetheless serve to limit harms imposed on the 
affected animals – wild or otherwise. 
 
2. AWIA and current attempts to factor in animal welfare in wild animal controversies 
Disagreements over the use of animals in research, originally focusing on “vivisection”, go back to 
the nineteenth century at least, where they developed into a public debate, not least in the UK. The 
debate over farm animal production began later, after the Second World War, in reaction to the 
methods of modern intensive farm animal production. In both of these controversies two highly 
influential responses to the question of how sentient animals could continue to be used in an ethical-
ly acceptable way involved the idea of welfare assessment. They both originated in the UK, and 
were separated by a period of ten years.  
 
The first response was the result of efforts made by the moderate animal welfare NGO, Universities 
Federation for Animal Welfare (UFAW), which started to argue for the humane use of laboratory 
animals in the mid-1950s. A study by the scientists William Russell and Rex Burch sponsored by 
UFAW led to a book, The Principles of Humane Experimental Technique (1959), which formulated 
the “3Rs” principles: Replacement, Reduction and Refinement. The two first Rs limited negative 
welfare impacts by reducing numbers of affected animals – either by finding ways to obtain results 
without using live animals or by using a smaller number of animals in each experiment. The aim of 
the last R, Refinement, was “simply to reduce to an absolute minimum the amount of distress im-
posed on those animals that are still used” (Russell & Burch 1959, p. 134). To this day, the 3Rs are 
a cornerstone of ethical laboratory animal use – from an animal welfare point of view – across the 
globe, and they are now written into EU legislation. 
 
The second response emerged from a report by a committee set up by the British government fol-
lowing the public outcry over intensive livestock farming prompted by Ruth Harrison’s book Ani-
mal Machines, published in 1964. The recommendations of the so-called Brambell Committee 
(Brambell, 1965) formed the basis of subsequent British and European animal welfare legislation. 
One important recommendation made by the committee was that studies based on methods from 
physiology and ethology should be treated as essential elements of animal welfare assessment 
which, in turn, should underpin animal welfare legislation. Although this requirement served initial-
ly to limit reform until scientific results were available, it eventually had a huge impact on the way 
farm animal welfare is assessed, and subsequently managed and regulated, first in Europe and in-
creasingly thereafter across the globe. 
 
Looking back on these initiatives, it is important to recognise that the aim of securing common 
ground for discussions about how to treat animals in research and agriculture has only partially been 
met. Thus in the area of laboratory use there is, among other things, an ongoing controversy be-
tween those who insist on a moratorium on animal use and those who are content to ensure that an-
imal use is humane – that is, between those who favour "Replacement" and those who favour "Re-
finement” (Sandøe et al 2015). Similarly, in farm animal welfare there are ongoing discussions 
about how to define animal welfare and how to balance it with other concerns, notably economic 
priorities (Sandøe & Jensen 2013). This second discussion seems to be especially relevant to the 
question of how effectively AWIA can be used to inform decisions about badger control.  
 
3. Using AWIA in dealing with badger control 
The badger is common in the British countryside and is not classified as an endangered species. It 
has powerful symbolic value, and is portrayed almost as an emblem of the British (and particularly 
the English) countryside. Thus, it comes as no great surprise that “few subjects are likely to enrage 
British wildlife lovers more than the idea of a badger cull” (de Castella 2010). It is a struggle which 
has divided both the country(side) and the scientific community (Macdonald et al. 2006). Given 
this, AWIA could be seen as part of a welcome attempt to make welfare impact of possible man-
agement options part of the basis for reaching, at least partial agreement on what to do.   
 
That said, the AWIA of badger control undertaken by the authors gives rise, in our view, to three 
concerns. (1) This AWIA imports at least two very controversial premises: (a) that slaughter and 
other forms of killing are a welfare issue in their own right; and (b) that limiting the number of 
cows that need to be slaughtered is mainly a welfare issue rather than a question of preventing harm 
to the economy of farmers. In addition, (2) the actual application of AWIA to badger culling seems 
somewhat crude and leaves a lot of uncertainty about the actual welfare consequences for the af-
fected animals. Finally, (3) AWIA is in some places described by the authors, very ambitiously in 
our view, as an undertaking that will serve as a complete ethical assessment. 
 
In relation to the actual application of AWIA to badger control, the authors support AWIA by not-
ing that the current assessment is conducted on a “case-by-case basis [which] is not sufficiently 
rigorous” (p. 29) and which allegedly makes it possible to leave out impacts “that are of critical 
importance to sentient animals” (ibid.). Thus, although current assessments of badger culling take 
into account some aspects of animal welfare by examining culling methods and especially the po-
tential pain and suffering associated with the method applied at one end, and broader ecological 
impacts at the other end, the argument is that this kind of assessment overlooks an important wel-
fare issue: the killing of badgers. 
 
It can certainly be argued that killing an animal is a welfare issue in the sense that the animal will 
lose whatever future welfare it would have enjoyed had it not been killed (Kasperbauer & Sandøe 
2016). But it is not necessarily a welfare issue if we equate welfare with freedom from suffering: 
the killing method may, in other words, be painless. By including killing as a welfare issue in its 
own right the authors are clearly not just providing “objective data to feed into policy making” but 
are rather making a decidedly controversial claim. The great majority of cattle are slaughtered or 
culled prematurely. Would the authors consider this as a massive welfare problem? This is not a 
claim cattle farmers would accept, and therefore it does not fall within the purpose of AWIA as 
stated by the authors. 
 
With regard to the actual suffering of badgers, welfare is, according to the authors, divided into di-
rect welfare impacts of a cull, such a “being shot and not dying instantaneously” (p. 30) and indirect 
impacts caused by “the disruption of social groups as a result of badgers being short and disturbance 
to the badger populations…” (p. 30). Apparently, a two-step impact assessment is carried out, ex-
amining the welfare of individuals being killed and the welfare of the populations in turn (The latter 
might appear to reflect ecological concerns rather than individual animal welfare concerns.) How-
ever, the assessment is rather crude. For example, it does not include problems with badgers getting 
away wounded, and it does not make a comparison with other means of control – for example, the 
British Veterinary Association Council have recommended that cage trapping and shooting should 
be the preferred method (Hirst, 2017). 
 
Perhaps, in developing AWIA further here, we could take a lead from the approach advanced by 
Littin et al. (2014, p. 282) for welfare assessments of the control of vertebrate ‘pests’. In this ap-
proach, accurate evaluation of welfare impacts is based on “a combination of behavioural, physio-
logical and pathological indicators”. AWIA shares the two dimensions of positive or negative ani-
mal welfare impact here: duration (in AWIA divided into ‘short’, ‘medium’, ‘long’) and intensity 
(in AWIA divided into ‘mild’, ‘moderate’, ‘strong’). But it is less detailed than the Littin approach 
and does not distinguish between different kinds of suffering, such as thirst, hunger, cold, pain, dis-
tress, isolation, and fear (cf. Littin et al., 2004). Littin and her colleagues say little about the relative 
importance of these dimensions (and indicators). Here inspiration could be found in the Five Do-
mains Model (Beausoleil and Mellor 2015).  
 
We are unclear whether the ambition of AWIA is to serve as a tool for the assessment of badgers, 
and cattle, and maximised total welfare, or rather, more modestly, its purpose is to help identify a 
management option where badger welfare is compromised as little as possible. Sometimes it seems 
the authors have the former, very demanding, ambition. However, as interesting as this ambition is 
in theoretical terms, it is not likely to provide common ground for a discussion of badger culling. 
For the farmers affected by TB, the issue is not primarily about welfare (according to a recent EFSA 
(2017) opinion, cows do not suffer as a consequence of carrying TB). Rather it is about economic 
viability versus abstaining from culling badgers. The suggestion that AWIA will solve this issue is, 
in our view, quite unrealistic. 
 
We see more merit in the AWIA as a tool that helps us to deal with wild animal controversies in a 
manner that minimises negative effects on the welfare of the affected animals relative to the goals 
of the controversial intervention. Historically, the welfare of free-living wildlife has not received 
much attention from animal welfare scientists, legislators and the public (Hampton et al., 2015) – 
discussions of methods used to control such animals excepted, of course. One of the reasons may 
be, as McCulloch and Reiss grant, that these kinds of assessment are indeed difficult: it is hard to 
agree on what factors and aspects should be included, and how to quantify, for example, impacts 
such as perturbation and stress to the badger population. 
 
Important issues needing to be considered in the onward development and potential use of AWIA 
concern the length of time over which assessments need to be run, and what the indicators for target 
and non-target species should be. The predictability of the welfare outcome and the rate of welfare 
outcome success are also important aspects of sound decision making (Dubois et al., 2017). Alt-
hough some of these things may be hard to define, let alone quantify or measure, the selected indi-
cators may act as a sort of checklist in deliberations on the desirability and feasibility of different 
policy and management options in wild animal controversies.  
 
 
4. Prospects of applying AWIA to other wild animal controversies  
Wild animal controversies are ubiquitous today. In many, a systematic impact assessment of direct 
and, especially, indirect impacts on the welfare of affected animals could be helpful. 
 
Let us put the badger case to one side and illustrate this with a different example. Across Europe, 
Classical Swine Fever (CSF), also known as hog cholera or pig plague, is of growing concern. In 
some cases it has led to large-scale culling of farmed pigs following infection. Wild boars are po-
tential transmitters of the virus to domestic pigs – for example, via contact with domestic pigs al-
lowed to roam outdoors. This is a serious concern in Denmark: we have the highest number of pigs 
per capita in the EU, and we have not had an incident of CSF since 1933.  
 
In Denmark, the wild boar was eradicated 250 years ago. However, it is now moving back into 
Denmark from neighbouring Germany, where the population has expanded rapidly over the last 20 
years – something which nature conservation organisations have welcomed as an element in the 
creation of a more dynamic natural environment. Since 1996 there has been a government order to 
cull any free-ranging wild boars in Denmark because of the risk of CSF. 
 
In 2005, an extensive risk assessment was carried out, because it had become clear that wild boars 
might be able to establish themselves in parts of Denmark on the German border despite the culling 
order (Gamborg & Sandøe, 2006). However, this assessment did not look into potential impacts of 
the cull on the welfare of the wild boar. As it happens, there were plenty of welfare issues to ad-
dress: for example, the pest control order permitted boar culling all year round, which meant that 
piglets could potentially be left without a sow or boar (sometimes twice a year, as wild boars are 
able to have two litters a year).  
 
Tellingly, a 194-page report on the experience of managing free-ranging wild boar in Sweden and 
Germany, devotes just one paragraph to animal welfare – and this is in relation to different hunting 
methods and the risk of wounding the animal (Madsen et al., 2010). This may reflect a wider trend: 
in an edited volume, published in 2015, on human-wildlife conflicts and how to identify their solu-
tion (Redpath et al., 2015) there was no mention of animal welfare issues. Here, a tool like AWIA 
could have been useful in drawing attention to animal welfare – and especially indirect welfare as-
pects, as control is usually carried out by hunting, which is generally seen as a relatively painless 
method, and one in which relatively few incidents of wounding are reported (although in some 
countries, such as Texas, USA, severe cruelty in the hunting of wild boar has been reported (Hirtzer 
2017)). 
 
The inclusion of animal welfare in policy decisions which are likely affect sentient animals in a 
significant way will, of course, always leave room for some moral disagreement. There will be dis-
agreement both over the welfare assessment itself and over the balancing of different concerns such 
as human welfare, human and animal health, and biodiversity, against concerns about animal wel-
fare. Therefore, a modest approach with a focus on minimizing the suffering of affected animals 
might be the most productive. The potential to find common ground between conservationists and 
animal welfare activists has been shown by Dubois and Fraser (2013). Of course, disagreement may 
nevertheless occur – for example, simply because the most humane methods for controlling wild 
animals are not always most effective (Littin and Mellor, 2005).  
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